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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The points presented by this appeal involve one of the
major water systems in the State of Utah, comprising Utah
Lake, Jordan River and facilities for the diversion of
water from said lake and river into canals from which it
is distributed· for irrigation, domestic, industrial and other
beneficial uses.
Geography
Utah Lake is a natui,"al body of water lying in western
Utah County and having a surface area, at compromise
elevation (a point later defined herein) of approximately
93,000 acres. This lake is formed by the inflow of streams
such as the Provo River, the Spanish Fork River and several smaller streams draining into it from the Wasatch
Mountains to the east. The water is impounded in the lake
because of the restricted outlet. The Jordan River at the
north end of the lake is the only natural outlet of the lake
and carries the overflow of Utah Lake down its channel
to the Great Salt Lake. -To the north of Utah Lake and
adjacent to the Jordan River, there lies sixty or seventy
thousand acres of fertile lands which require irrigation in
order to become agriculturally productive. Salt Lake City
lies north of Utah Lake and easterly from the Jordan River
and requires water for culinary, domestic and industrial
purposes.

Development of Rights to Use of Waters of Utah Lake
· and Jordan River
During the period between 1872 and 1883, each of the
plaintiffs constructed a canal from the Jordan River at
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points near the boundary line between Salt Lake County
and Utah County at an aggregate cost of $805,000.00 (R.
57-60). In 1872, Salt Lake County constructed a ·dam in
the Jordan River, near the boundary line between Salt
Lake County and Utah County for the purpose of diverting
the water of Jordan River from its natural channel and
causing the same to flow through the said several canals of
plaintiffs for the uses and purposes aforesaid. This dam
has been referred to as the "Old Dam" or "Turner Dam."
Subsequent to its erection, title to said dam was transferred·
to plaintiffs. (R. 60-61).
The capacity of said several canals and the quantities
of water to which plaintiffs were adjudged the right to use,
subject to prior rights, by decree entered in the District
Court of Salt Lake County (commonly known as the "Morse
Decree"), are as follows:
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Company .... 246 second feet
East Jordan Irrigation Co. . ......... 170 second feet
Salt Lake City ..................... 150 second feet
South
Jordan Canal Co. . ............. 142 second feet
li.
North Jordan Canal Co. . . . . . .
. .... 120 second feet
Total

,

/ / / n·

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 828 second feet

During the years 1889 and 1890, plaintiffs constructed
above the "Old Dam," a dam which was commonly known
as the "Indian Ford Dam," or "New Dam." Except for the
sill of the Indian Ford Dam, neither it nor the Old Dam are
now in existence. The location of said canals and diversion
and measuring devices is shown on a map of the Engineering Department of Salt Lake City (R. 216).
I
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Utah Lake fluctuates in its elevation and thereby in
its water productivity from year -to year and from time
to time within each year, dependent upon the precipitation
falling upon the watersheds tributary to the lake (R. 216).
In order to conserve and equalize the outflow of Utah Lake,
impounding dams were installed in the channel of Jordan
River to retard the outflow from the lake during the nonirrigation season and thereby to convert Utah Lake from
a natural reservoir to a natural and artificial reservoir.
Just to the extent that the natural outflow of the lake was
retarded, the level of the lake was artificially raised and
the lands along the shore of the lake were to that extent
inundated. This situation inevitably resulted in a controversy between those who were impounding the water
and the owners of the. lands along the shores of the lake.
The impounding of the waters of Utah Lake prevented their
wasting into Great Salt Lake during the nonirrigation
season and thereby provided a more adequate water supply
for the valuable agricultural lands in Salt Lake County, but
this, in turn, inundated to some extent agricultural lands
in Utah County. This provoked a real controversy involving
very substantial rights.
In 1884, the controversy was referred to arbitrators,
who were prominent citizens of Salt Lake and Utah Counties. The substance of the decision arrived at by the arbitrators was incorporated in an agreement which was entered into in the year 1885 between plaintiffs and owners
of lapds bordering Utah Lake, which agreement has been
known through the years as "Compromise Agreement" (R.
12-53).
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Compromise Agreement
Compromise Agreement which is pleaded In full and
attached to plaintiffs' complaint has never been modified
and is still in full force and effect (R. 91, 117). Said controversy, arising from the plaintiffs' holding back and
storing the waters of Utah Lake and thereby flooding lands
lying adjacent thereto, was fully settled by Compromise
Agreement. Under its terms, the plaintiffs paid an agreed
and substantial sum to the landowners in Utah County,
in consideration of which said landowners granted to
plaintiffs a perpetual easement to flood the lands of said
landowners, free from liability or damage, to the extent that
the storage of water in said lake raised the level thereof
to a point known as "Compromise Point." Compromise
Agreement also provides for the election annually by the
parties thereto of a board of five persons known as the
"Utah Lake Commission," under whose directions the rights granted by said agreement should be exercised by
plaintiffs. For such purpose, said agreement constitutes
said board the agent of the parties thereto. (Said commission is also known as "Utah Lake and Jordan Dam Commission.")
The Colladge Case
. Subsequent to the execution of Compromise Agreement, a controversy developed involving the interpretation
of the terms of the agreement and the rights of the parties
thereunder. On or about March 31, 1894, plaintiffs commenced an action in the District Court for the First Judicial
District, Utah Territory, against the owners of land bordering Utah Lake to establish Compromise Point as describ-
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ed in Compromise Agreement, and to have determined the
extent to whch the easement granted thereunder permitted
the flooding of lands bordering Utah Lake by the holding
back and impounding of the waters of said lake. A judg..
ment anq Decree was ent~red in said action on January
3, 1896, which was reviewed by this court. Salt Lake City
v. Colladge, 13 Utah 522, 45 P. 891. On November 5, 1896,
Judge A. C. Hatch, of said district court, made and entered
corre~ted Findings of Fact and Judgment and Decree in
accordance with the Supreme Court's decision (R. 8, 9,
54-78, 86, 111). Compromise Point is established by the decree entered
in the Colladge Case as follows:
"It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged -and Decreed,
that the plaintiffs have the right to maintain the
waters of Utah Lake at an elevation four feet six
inches ( 4 ft. 6 in.) below the top of the stone monument near the head of Jordan River which was
established by the Utah Lake Commission in 1885,
said elevation being the point referred to in the
contract set out in the findings of fact herein as
'three feet three and one-half inches (3 ft. 31/2 in.)
above the point heretofore established and recognized as low water mark in said lake.'
"It is further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed
that a survey shall be made and a permanent monument shall hereafter be established and maintained
at the expense of the plaintiffs in said Utah Lake
at a point to be hereafter agreed upon by the parties
hereto ·or fixed by the court, between a point one
mile north of Provo River and a point five miles
south of the mouth of said river, where it will be
least subject to temporary fluctuations of the height
of the water by winds or the influx of Spanish Fork
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and Provo Rivers, to perpetuate said agreed elevation, and that said monument when so established,
shall be maintained as the· controlling evidence of
the elevation at which the water of said lake is authorized to be maintained by the plaintiffs under said
contract" (R. 76).
Pursuant to the above provision of said decree, a survey was made by A. F. Doremus and Charles DeMoisey for
the purpose of establishing a permanent monument to perpetuate Compromise Point. Such monument was erected
on an island in said lake known as Snail Island. Some years
prior to the present action, the Snail Island Monument was
destroyed as a result of erosion, washing of the waves, ice
and other causes (R. 9, 86, 112).
With respect to the Utah Lake Commission created
by Compromise Agreement, Justice Bartch, speaking for
the Court in the Colladge Case, said :
"For the pUrpose of carrying the agreement
into effect, provision was made for the appointment
of a· commission, who were constituted the agents
of both parties to the contract, and, among other
things, were empowered to determine and direct
when and to what extent obstructions might be
placed into the waterway of the dam, not to exceed the highest elevation specified in the contract."
The Court then proceeds to make a very significant
construction of Compromise Agreement as to the purpose,
status and powers of the Utah Lake Commission. Inter
alia the court holds :
"The remaining material question in this case
is whether the Utah Lake commissioners have auth-
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ority, under the contract, to permit the appellants to
place additional obstructions in the dam, between
October 1st, in any year, and March 15th following,
if such obstructions have been ordered out and removed after the 1st day of October. The trial court
decided this question in the negative, as appears
from the clause of the decree which reads as follows:
'If the said commissioners order the removal of the
planks or other obstructions after the 1st day of
October in any year, the plaintiffs shall not have
leave to replace the same until the 15th day of
March of the following year, nor at that time, unless
the· commissioners shall so decide.' The appellants
claim that this is the result of an erroneous construction of the contract, and is not in harmony
with the intent of the parties to it, and that the
intention of the parties in creating the commission
was to give it all the power necessary to enable it
to carry the contract into effect according to its
true intent and meaning. The commission was created 'for the purpose of better carrying' the contract
into effect, and the contract, so far as material
here, provides as follows: 'The said persons shall.
constitute a board, and are hereby empowered, as
the legally constituted agents of the parties hereto,
to determine and direct when and to what extent
obstructions may be placed in the said waterway of
the dam for the purpose of storing the lake with
water for future use, not to exceed the highest elevation hereinbefore specified; provided, that if in
any year, on or after the 15th day of March, it shall
be ascertained by said board that the fall of snow
during the past winter has been light, and if the
said board are of the opinion that the water of Utah
Lake will probably not rise to the highest level
hereinbefore mentioned, then the said board shall
permit the said parties of the second part to raise
said dam to a height to be fixed by said board, which
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shall cause the water of said lake to rise to said
level; and, if it shall be ascertained by experience
and observation that the said parties of the second
part can obtain all the water necessary for irrigation purposes by keeping the waterway of the dam
open until the waters of Utah Lake shall have receded below the highest level mentioned, then the
said board shall require the waterway to be kept
open until the water recedes to such level as the
board shall deem sufficient to supply the said parties of the second part with water; and provided,
further, that when at any time in each year, to be
fixed by said board, the high water of Utah Lake
shall have receded'- to the highest elevation above
herein specified, the parties of the second part shall
have the right, without hindrance from any person
or persons, to cause the waters of said Utah Lake to
be held back by regulating said dam not to exceed
the elevation above mentioned, and use the said
water as they may desire until such date, on or
after the 1st day of October, as said board shall
decide, at which date the said parties of the second
part shall open the entire waterway of said dam
(excepting the uprights) down to the sill or base
thereof, and permit the said waters to run free.'
Under this provision of the contract, it is insisted
by the respondents that, if the additional obstructions are ordered removed by the commission after
the 1st day of October in any year, they cannot be
replaced until after the 15th day of March next
following. This would imply that, if they were not
ordered removed, they might remain in the dam
during the entire winter. We do not think such a
construction is warranted by the language employed,
nor by the purpose and object for which the commission was created. While the plaintiffs are not
permitted to replace the obstructions, of their own
motion, after they have been ordered out, still the
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commission may order them replaced at any time
when the circumstances and condition of the lake
warrant the obstructing of the flow of the water,
so as to comply with the terms of the contract. The
purpose and duty of the commission are to watch
the condition of the lake, and guard the interests of
both parties to the contract. In the absence of express words to that effect, we do not' feel warranted
to adopt a construction which would empower the
commission to permit the planks to remain in the
dam from October 1st to March 15th, but prohibit
them from replacing .them before March 15th, if, for
any purpose, they should order them to be removed
after the 1st of October; nor, after. a careful
consideration of the entire contract, are we able to
ascertain any good reason why such a construction
should be adopted; nor is there anything to indicate
that such was the intention of the parties at the
time of making the contract. We conclude that the
appellants' contention as to this point must also be
sustained, and that the finding of facts and decree,
in relation to this question, must be modified so as
to authorize the commission to replace additional
obstructions in the waterway of the dam before the
15th day of March in any year, even if they were
taken out after the 1st day of October."

The "Morse. Decree"
Subsequent to the decision in the Colladge Case, a controversy arose involving the water rights of the users in
Salt Lake County of the water of Utah Lake and Jordan
River. This resulted in the filing of three actions in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, the parties to which
were the numerous claimants to the use of said waters. The
three causes were consolidated and tried together by Honor-
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able C. W. Morse, Judge of said court, who on July 15,
1901, made and entered the Judgment and Decree of the
court and thereafter and in connection therewith made and
entered certain supplemental decrees and orders. Said
decrees and orders, which are commonly referred to as the
"Morse Decree," have become historic in the settlement and
administration of the water rights involved. For the convenience of this court in referring thereto, we submit herewith copies of said decrees and orders. In the year 1902,
the Morse Decree was reviewed and affirmed by this court.
Salt Lake City, et al. v. Salt Lake City Water and Electric
Power Co. et al., 24 Utah 249, 67 P. 672.
I
The District Court of Salt Lake County retained original jurisdiction of said cause, the subject matter thereof,
and the parties thereto for the purpose of all necessary
supplementary orders and decrees which might be required
to make effectual the rights awarded and preserved by
said decree. For such purpose, the court appointed a commissioner at a certain monthly salary, "to superintend and
direct the measurement and division of all the water, distributed by this Decree in accordance therewith ; to direct,
supervise and inspect all mains and appliances for the
diversion, conveyance, and use of the same, and to report
from time to time to the court, any violation of the provisions of this Decree." Since the entry of the Morse Decree,
the diversion and distribution of the waters of Utah Lake
and Jordan River have been continuously under the exclusive control of a commissioner appointed by the District
Court of Salt Lake County or a water commissioner appointed by the State Engineer of the State of Utah as provided by Chapter 5, Title 73, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
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It is obvious that the fluctuating natural flow of J ordan River was not adequate each year to satisfy the requirements of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, in order to make
available a regular and dependable supply of water, undertook, prior to 1906, to, and did, install, a number of pumps
at the mouth of the Jordan River, designed to deliver into
the channel of the Jordan River a quantity of water greatly
in excess of the amount that would flow by gravity into the
channel of the river when the level of the lake was at or
below Compromise Point. The effect of the pumping of
such excess quantities of water was to lower the level of
Utah Lake; therefore, the level of the lake has at all times
since 1907, been lower than it would have been except for
said pumping.

Diversion Works and Measuring Devices
at Jordan Narrows
The Morse Decree, among other things, directed that
the parties thereto, under the direction and supervision
of a commissioner appointed by the court, const;ruct and
maintain proper facilities for measuring and distributing
the waters awarded under said decree. Subsequently, upon
a hearing involving the foregoing provision of said decree,
Judge Morse of the District Court of Salt Lake County appointed a Board of Engineers, which included the court
commissioner, to examine and make recommendations as
to what facilities were necessary to distribute the waters
of said lake and river in accordance with said decree. Such
recommendations were duly made, and the court, under its
retained jurisdiction, ordered, "That certain controlling,
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regulating and measuring devices shall be placed in the
Jordan River, in order to properly regulate the flow of
water in said river, so that the various parties may draw
therefrom with substantial accuracy, the quantity of water
to which they are respectively entitled, under the original
decree entered in this cause." Said order was ente~ed by
the District Court of Salt Lake County on February 13,
1914, (R.. 158-163) ; and it was reviewed and affirmed by
this court. Salt Lake City v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Company, 43 Utah 591, 137 P. 638. Such devices were constructed in 1914 in the Jordan River at the Jordan Narrows as ordered by said court and in accordance with the
plans and specifications recommended by the commissioner
and approved by the court.
Defendants claim under their counterclaims that said
facilities at the Jordan Narrows have been maintained and
operated by plaintiffs in violation of Compromise Agree-·
ment (R. 102-103, 126-127). It will be remembered, however, that the construction of these installations was ordered
by the court and, since their installation to the present time,
they have been continuously under the control of and operated by either a commissioner appointed by the court or
a water commissioner appointed by the state engineer. Such
operations have been carried on for nearly forty years with
full knowledge of and without protest by defendants or the
Utah Lake Commission; nor has any action been instituted
by defendants to prevent the use or affect the operation of
said facilities, until the filing of their counterclaims in the
present suit. Plaintiffs have pleaded as defenses to said
counterclaims that the defendants are now estopped and
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barred by laches to contend that these facilities in any way
invade their rights (R. 172-175, 183-185). Upon motion
of defendants, however, the. trial court has stricken the
defenses of estoppel and laches ( R. 205) .

General Adjudication of Water Rights in Utah Lake,
Jordan River and Their Tributaries
In the year 1936, Salt Lake City, et al., commenced an
action in the District Court of Salt Lake County against
approximately 2,430 defendants to quiet title to the use
of the waters of Utah Lake, Jordan River and their tributaries. As a result of the proceedings had in that case, the
Supreme Court held that the trial court must proceed with
a general adjudication of all the rights to the use of the
waters of said lake and river, and their tributaries, in the
manner provided by Chapter 4, Title 100, R. S. U. 1933,
and amendments thereto, ( C.hapter 4, Title 73, Utah Code
Annotated 1953). Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 106, Utah
350, 148 P. (2d) 346. The case was remanded to the district for such purpose and on September 1, 1944, said
court entered its order decreeing a statutory adjudication
(R. 150-151). Said action ..... is still pending.
On February 9, 1945, the District Court of Salt Lake
County, ordered that the state engineer be authorized to
appoint water commissioners as provided by Sec. 100-5-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, (Sec. 73-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953), to distribute all waters of Utah Lake, Jordan
River and their tributaries in accordance with existing decrees, pending said action for a general adjudication (R.
152-154).
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There is on file and of record in the office of the state
engineer annual reports filed by the water commissioner so
appointed by the state engineer for the administration and
distribution of the waters of Utah Lake and Jordan River.
These are public records ot which the courts take judicial
notice. They set forth in detail said commissioner's administration of the waters of Utah Lake and Jordan River
and his operations in effecting a distribution of said waters
to the parties entitled to the use thereof under existing
decrees.
Outline of Issues in Present Case
Utah Lake, Jordan River and the diversion works for
distributing the waters thereof to the users entitled thereto
constitute one complete and entire water system. Salt Lake
City v. Utah and Salt Lake Canal Co. (supra). The administration of the waters of said system are dependent
on the storage rights provided for upder Compromise
Agreement. The existing decrees evidencing the rights
of the many users of said waters are conditioned upon such
storage rights. The rights granted under Compromise
Agreement as defined and preserved by the Colladge Case
are in turn dependent upon the location of Compromise
Point.
For sometime prior to the commencement of the present
action, there has existed a controversy as to the true location of Compromise Point as established by the decree
entered in the Colladge Case. The uncertainty as to the
location of Compromise Point arose from the destruction
of the Snail Island Monument which was erected pursuant
to said decree as the controlling evidence of Compromise
Point, and from the dislocation of the stone monument
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designated in said decree as being near the head of the
Jordan River. This question as to the true elevation of
compromise level prompted the state engineer to make a
survey in the year 1946, for the purpose of re-establishing
Compromise Point. (Report of Water Commissioner on Utah
Lake and Jordan River Distribution. for the Year 1946,
Pages 56-61). The correct location of Compromise Point
must be known to the state engineer in order that he may
discharge his duties in the administration and distribution
of the waters of Utah Lake and Jordan River during the
pendency of the statutory adjudication.
On September 7, 1951, plaintiffs filed the present action
to re-establish Compromise Point as judicially fixed and
determined under the Colladge Case. This is the sole purpose of this action and it merely invokes the retained equitable jurisdiction of the court which originally rendered the
decree in the Colladge Case, to effectuate the rights evidenced and preserved thereby. Defendants admit that a
controversy has arisen making it necessary that said court
declare and determine the true elevation of Compromise
Point, and join with plaintiffs in seeking such relief (R.
87, 106, 113, 129). The granting of such relief as sought
by all parties to this action could not in anyway change,
modify or affect the rights of any party as established under
the Colladge Case, or otherwise.
Defendants have set up alleged counterclaims in said
proceedings under which they seek injunctive relief and
damages (R. 100-108, 124-130). Defendants also filed affidavits, petitions and motions for an order to show cause
why a preliminary injunction should pot be issued against
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plaintiffs (R. 131-138). The court entered such order to
show cause on December 6, 1952 (R. 139-140). Plaintiffs
filed answers to said affidavits and petitions for preliminary injunction (R. 141-168). This matter is still pending.
Plaintiffs also filed motions to strike certain matters and
defenses from said counterclaims and to dismiss the same
(R. 192-197). Said m(}tions were denied, except plaintiffs'
motion to strike the third and fourth defenses contained
in the answer of said defendants (R. 198-199). The plaintiffs filed replies to said counterclaims (R. 169-188). Upon
motion of defendants the trial court ordered stricken certain
defenses from said replies and certain portions from plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit and petition for preliminary -injunction (R. 204-205). Upon plaintiffs' petition, this court granted an interlocutory appeal from said
last-mentioned orders (R. 217). The additional pertinent
matters contained in the foregoing pleadings are specifically
set forth under our argument.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The counterclaims should be dismissed because the
undisputed facts established by the record in this case and
of which the court takes judicial notice, show that said
counterclaims state no claim and present no issue upon
which relief can be granted against plaintiffs.
2. The trial court erred in striking from plaintiffs'
replies the third and fourth defenses contained therein.
3. The trial court erred in striking from plaintiffs'
replies the fifth defense contained therein.
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4. The trial court erred in striking from plaintiffs'
replies the tenth defense to the counterclaim of the defendant, Provo City, and the eleventh defense to the counterclaim of defendants, Utah Lake Farmers Association,
et al.
5. The trial court erred in striking from plaintiffs'
reply to the counterclaim of the defendant, Utah Lake
Farmers Association, et al., the twelfth defense contained
therein.
6. The trial court erred in striking from plaintiffs'
replies the eleventh defense to the counterclaim of the defendant, Provo City, and the thirteenth defense to the
counterclaim of defendants, Utah Lake Farmers Association, et al.
7. The trial court erred in striking from plaintiffs'
replies the twelth defense to the counterclaim of the defendant, Provo City, and the fourteenth defense to the
counterclaim of the defendants, Utah Lake Farmers Association, et al.
8. The trial court erred in striking certain portions
from plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit for preliminary injunction.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO.1
THE COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BE CAUSE THE UNDISPUTED
FACTS ESTABLISHED BY THE RECORD IN
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THIS CASE AND OF WHICH THE COURT
TAKES JUDICIAL NOTICE, SHOW THAT SAID
COUNTERCLAIMS STATE NO CLAIM . AND
PRESENT NO ISSUE UPON WHICH RELIEF
CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST PLAINTIFFS.
Under their counterclaims, defendants allege that plaintiffs have violated Compromise Agreement as follows:
"15. That during previous years, to increase
carryover water, and after October 1st, 1951 and
during 1952 to date, the plaintiffs without right or
authority and in violation of the terms of said
Compromise Agreement, have caused planks and
other obstructions to be placed and maintained in
their dam at the Jordan Narrows and have maintained said dam_ without the openings required by
said Compromise Agreement and that even while
the level of Utah Lake has been far above Compromise Point during the present year, and with unprecedented runoffs into Utah Lake, anticipated and
experienced, the plaintiffs have, without authority
or right, continued to so obstruct the said Jordan
River, thereby unreasonably and wrongfully retarding the flow of water from Utah Lake and causing large areas of valuable land surrounding Utah
Lake belonging to defendants and those similarily
situated to be, and remain, inundated to .the great
an4 irreparable damage of the owners thereof, including these defendants, and these defendants allege upon information and belief that plaintiffs intend, and will continue, to so wrongfully maintain
said obstructions in said river to the irreparable
damage of these defendants and those similarly
situated unless restrained and enjoined by this
court" (R. 102-103, 1?6-127).
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The claim hereinabove quoted is directed at the facilities which were installed in the Jordan River at the Jordan
Narrows under an order of the District Court of Salt Lake
County entered in the year 1914, for the purpose of effecting a distribution of the waters of said lake and river
in accordance with existing decrees (R. 144-149). To avoid
the obvious impact of the defenses of estoppel, laches and
the statute of limitations, defen~ants in support of their
motions to strike state the nature of their claim as follows:
"Despite these and similar allegations, the plaintiffs' purported third defense does not state a defense by way of estoppel, or any other basis. We
are not complaining so much about the structure at
Jordan Narrows itself as the way it has been handled and operated, particularly during 1952. The
damages prayed for are damages accruing in 1953
and future irreplaceable damage that is threatened (R. 216). (Emphasis Ours).
"Plaintiffs throughout this proceeding have emphasized the fact that up until 1952 the lake had not
been at compromise for many years. We primarily
are seeking in the counterclaim to recover damages
for 1952 and to prevent the recurrence of damages
by the unlawful flowage of our lands in future years"
(R. 216). (Emphasis Ours.)
The simple truth of the matter is th~t plaintiffs have
not "handled and operated" the installations at the Jordan
Narrows, either in 1952 or at any other time since their
construction in 1914. For many years following the construction of these facilities, they were continuously under
the control and management of a commissioner appointed
by the District Court of Salt Lake County. In the year 1925,
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the commissioner appointed by said court was superseded
by a water commissioner appointed by the state engineer
to administer and distribute the waters of Utah Lake and
Jordan River, as provided by Chapter 5, Title 73, Utah
Code Annotated 1953. Since the original appointment of
said water commissioner, the state engineer, through his
duly appointed commissioners, has continuously distributed
the waters of said lake and river and operated the controlling works and measuring devices installed for such
purpose. Detailed reports, fully covering the state engineer's administration of Utah Lake and Jordan River,
are on file and of record in his office. This court takes
judicial notice of these records. Sec. 78-25-1, Utah Code
Annotated 1953. American Fork Irr. Co. v. Linke, 239 P.
(2d) 188.
In Minersville Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. Rocky Ford Irr.
Co., 90 Utah 283, 61 P. (2d) 605, this court held that the
purpose and functions of a water commissioner appointed
by the state engineer are:
"The primary purpose of a water commissioner
is to assist the court in carrying out its decrees. His
duties are to aid the courts and the state engineer
in the distribution to the various water user..s of
the quantity of water to which each is entitled. The
commissioner is an arm of the court and the state
engineer in enforcing and protecting the various
water users in their rights. He is appointed by the
state engineer upon recommendation of the interested water users. The state engineer may remove
him for cause upon an application of a water user
and a hearing had thereon. The same power inheres in the court under which he serves. R. S.
1933, 100-5-1."
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Water commissioners appointed by the state engineer
have exclusive control of the distribution of the waters
which come under their administration. In the exercise
of such control, they must abide by existing decrees. Caldwell v. Erickson, 61 Utah 259, 213 P. 182. The commissioner
appointed to distribute the ~aters of Utah Lake and Jordan River is required to make such distribution in accordance with the "Morse Decree" and in conformity with
the storage rights adjudicated and defined by the decree
entered in the Colladge Case. This requires that he recogn. ize the functions and action of the Utah Lake Commission,
an agency created by Compromise Agreement to carry the
same into effect and guard the respective interests of the
parties thereunder. It is significant that defendants do not
claim that the Utah Lake Commission has failed or neglected to discharge its duties under said agreement.
Although an action for damages cannot be maintained
against a water commissioner for alleged wrongs committed
in the discharge of his duties (Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah
483, 134 P. 626), any person aggrieved by such wrongs has
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to redress an invasion
of his rights. Salt Lake City v. Anderson (supra); Minersville Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. Rocky Ford Irr. Co. (supra).
If the water commissioner appointed by the state engineer
to administer the waters of Utah Lake and Jordan River
has violated Compromise Agreement, the defendants, the
Utah Lake Commission, or any other person affected thereby, had recourse to the court having jurisdiction to restrain
and prohibit such violation by injunctive orders.. Salt Lake
, City v. Anderson (supra).
I
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It is indisputable that neither the defendants nor the
Utah Lake Commission have ever invoked the judisdiction
of any court to obtain relief against the state engineer or
his water commissioner because of the alleged wrongs
complained of under the counterclaims. Instead, defendants demand damages and injunctive relief against plaintiffs for such alleged wrongs which, under the record presented in this case, were not and could not have been committed by plaintiffs.
The foregoing disposes of what plaintiffs characterize
as the primary reJief sought under their counterclaims. As
a further dereliction in the administration of the waters
of Utah Lake and Jordan River, however, said counterclaims. charge that the/ flowage rights granted under Com.. promise Agreement have been exceeded because part of the
water held back and inundating the lands adjacent to said
lake has reached the same by "return flow, seepage and
drainage" of water brought into this area from foreign
watersheds through reclamation projects; and also because
wells. drilled since Compromise Agreement have contributed
additional water to said lake (R. 100-102, 125-126) . It
is not contended that plaintiffs constructed the reclamation projects or drilled the wells which are alleged to be
responsible for such additional waters reaching Utah Lake.
Defendants claim that the easement granted by Compromise Agreement is limited to the flowage of their lands
by water of said lake having its source "from the watersheds directly contributing to Utah Lake and from precipitation" (R. 100-101, 125). Such a limitation of the flowage
rights granted under said agreement must be written
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therein by the court from parol evidence as it is neither
expressly nor impliedly stated therein. To the contrary,
said agreement expressly gr~nts to plaintiffs :
"Also the right free from interference or liabi}..
ity for damage to flow the lands of said parties of
the first part or either of them to the extent which
the dam above described may cause the same to be
flowed by the waters of the said Jordan River, Utah
Lake or otherwise" (R. 15-16). (Emphasis Ours).
Defendants would have the court impose such limitation and condition upon the easement granted under Compromise Agreement, contrary to its express terms, on the
basis of a speculation as to what was "contemplated" by
the original parties to said agreement (R. 100-102, 125126). To support such a claim, the court would be required
to find that the parties to said agreement could not foresee
the need for the development of additional sources of water
to supply the domestic, irrigation and other requirements
of a growing population in an arid state. Such a proposition is contrary to common knowledge.
The reasonable assumption is that both parties to Compromise Agreement contemplated that, as the population of
Utah and Salt Lake Counties grew, additional sources of
water would be required and that Compromise Point was
in fact a compromise as to the elevation to which the waters
of the Utah Lake could be impounded, regardless of the
source of such waters.
Aside from the speculation as to what the parties
may or may not have contemplated, Compromise Agreement
clearly and specifically defines the rights granted to plain-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
tiffs thereunder and the terms and conditions thereof have
been fully construed under the Colladge Case. Said agreement contains no such condition or limitation as now contended for by defendants. In 17 Am. Jur., Section 97, page
996, the author states: "If a grant is specific in its terms,
it is decisive of the limits of the easement." In Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109 Utah 213, 174 P.
(2d) 148, this court said:
"The additional burdens which the servient
owner may enjoin or for which he may receive
damages are those burdens over and above those
embraced within the framework of the easement
itself-not for additional burdens which may result from the easement owner exercising his right
to make changes in his method of using the easement which right was included in the easement as
originally acquired."
Finally, defendants allege that the channel of the
Jordan River has been adopted by plaintiffs as a private
channel for the transportation of their irrigation water.
Based on such allegation, defendants claim that it was
plaintiffs' duty to remove obstructions in said river caused
by landslides along the same, particularly those occurring
in 1952 when unprecedented flood conditions prevailed in
Utah and Salt Lake Counties. For such neglect of duty,
defendants demand damages and a mandatory injunction.
The premise upon which defendants base said claim is
contrary to the facts. It is a matter of common knowledge,
of which the court takes judicial notice, that the Jordan
River is not plaintiffs' private channel but a natural stream
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which has been used for more than half a century by many
persons other than plaintiffs to transport the waters of
Utah Lake and Jordan River to which they are entitled to
use under existing decrees. The right to convey appropriated waters in natural streams is subject to the control of
the state engineer. Sec. 73-3-20, Utah Code Annotated
1953. The authority to remove any natural obstacle from
any natural channels within a county is vested in the board
of county commissioners of such county. Sec. 17-8-5, Utah
Code Annotated 1953.
We respectfully subll!it that the counterclaims filed
herein should be dismissed because the undisputed facts
established by the record in this case and of which this court
takes judicial notice, show that said counterclaims state no
claim and cannot be amended to present any issue upon
which relief can be granted against plaintiffs.
POINT NO.2
THE TRIAL c·OURT ERRED IN STRIKING
FROM PLAINTIFFS' REPLIES THE THIRD
AND F 0 U R T H DEFENSES CONTAINED
THEREIN.
Said defenses are as follows:
"Third Defense
"Said defendants are not entitled to maintain
said counte~claim and are estopped from so doing
and are barred from any relief thereunder by reason of the facts, rna tters and circumstances he~ein
below set forth.
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"Utah Lake, the Jordan River and the dams
and appliances for impounding and diverting the
waters from said lake and river into the canals
leading from said river constitute one complete and
entire irrigation system. Ever since the corrected
decree entered in said Colladge case in the year 1896
to the time of filing said counterclaim said irrigation
system, dams and appliances for the impounding,
controlling, diverting, measuring and distributing
the waters of Utah Lake and the Jordan River have
been continuously maintained and operated with
the knowledge, acquiescence and without objection
of defendants or the Utah Lake and Jordan Dam
Commission, which Commission is, and at all times
herein mentioned has been, the duly constituted
agent of all the parties to Compromise Agreement
and their successors in interest, for the purpose of
carrying said agreement into effect and guarding
the interests of both parties to said agreement, with
power and authority to direct . when and to what
extent plaintiffs may place and maintain obstructions in said river as provided by said agreement.
Said Utah Lake and Jordan Dam Commission has
, , not at any time herein mentioned found, determined
or directed that plaintiffs .have constructed, maintained or operated dams or obstructions in said river
in violation of Compromis~ Agreement.
"The alleged dam in the Jordan Narrows referred to in paragraph 15 of said counterclaim and
the only dam or obstruction maintained in the river
at said place consist of certain controlling dams,
appliances and devices, with weirs thereon and
waterways therein, which were ordered and decreed
to be constructed and maintained at said place under
a S)lpplemental decree entered by the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on February
13, 1914, in consolidated cases No. 2861, No. 3449
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and No. 3459, in which cause, under the original
decree entered on July 19, 1901, the court adjudicated and quieted title to the water rights of numerous parties, including plaintiffs, in and to the
waters of the Utah Lake and Jordan River. Said
original decree was reviewed by the Supreme Court
of Utah in 24 Utah 249, 67 P. 672, and said supplemental decree was reviewed by the Supreme Court
of Utah in 43 Utah 591, 237 P. 638. Said works
were ordered to be constructed, so that the various
parties might draw therefrom with substantial accuracy the quantity of water to which they were
respectively entitled under the original decree entered in said cause. Said works were · constructed
for such public use in the year 1914 in accordance
with plans and specifications approved by said court
and ever since the construction of said works, they
have been operated and maintained as an integral
part of said irrigation system under the control and
regulation of the State Engineer of the State of
Utah, as provided by Chapter 5, Title 73, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, for ·the purpose of making available water for irrigating large areas of farm lands
in Salt Lake County, and water for Salt Lake City
whereby it obtains a substantial part of the culinary
water required by the inhabitants of said city, and
for other beneficial and public uses. Said works
were constructed, as aforesaid, through the expenditure of large sums of money with the knowledge,
acquiescence and without objection of the defendants, or the Utah Lake and Jordan Dam Commission, and ever since the construction of said works
until the filing of said counterclaim, said works
have been continuously maintained and operated, as
now complained of by defendants, for the purposes
and uses aforesaid, with the knowledge, acquiescence
and without objection by defendants; and said works
have been maintained and operated with the knowl- ,
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edge, approval and without objection by said Utah
Lake and Jordan Dam Commission, the duly constituted agent of all of the parties to Compromise
Agreement" (R. 172-174, 183-185) .
"Fourth Defense
"Said defendants are not entitled to maintain
said counterclaim nor to any relief thereunder by
reason of Jaches on the part of defendants as appears
from the facts, matters and circumstances hereinabove set forth in plaintiffs' third defense, which
facts, matters and circumstances are hereby adopted and incorporated herein as part of this defense"
(R. 175, 185).

·-

In view of Point No. 1, which calls for a dismissal of
' said counterclaims, Point No. 2 and the points hereinbelow
- argued, consequently supplement and substantiate Point
No. 1. Our argument under Point No. 2 deals with both
the third and fourth defenses because of the close relationship between the same.
It is significant that since the Colladge Case was de-

cided in 1896 until the filing of said counterclaims, neither
the parties to Compromise Agreement nor their successors
in interest have contended in any legal proceedings that
Compromise Agreement has been violated. The reason
for this is apparent: The. arbitrators and parties to Compromise Agreement, with practical foresight, provided
against such controversies and litigation. This was accomplished, as pointed out in the Colladge Case :
"For the purpose of carrying the agreement
into effect, provision was made for the appointment
of a commission, who were constituted the agents
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of both parties to the contract, and, among other
things, were empowered to determine and direct
when and to what extent obstructions might be placed into the waterway of the dam, not to exceed the
highest elevation provided in the contract."
The state engineer's records disclose that over the
course of years the level of Utah Lake has varied substantially from time to time according to the amount of
precipitation on the watersheds draining into said lake.
If Compromise Agreement had left it to the unilateral
determination of plaintiffs as to when and to what extent
obstructions could be placed in the Jordan River for impounding the waters of Utah Lake to compromise level, it
is inevitable that controversies and litigation would have
arisen over the exercise of the flowage rights granted to
plaintiffs under said agreement.
It is not claimed by defendants that the facilities for
controlling and diverting the waters of Utah Lake and
Jordan River have been maintained or operated at anytime.
contrary to the directives or decisions of the Utah Lake
Commission. The records of the state engineer's office disclose that there has been full cooperation between said
commission and the water commissioner appointed by the
state engineer to administer and distribute the waters of
said lake and river.
This court has frequently recognized that Utah is an
arid state·, whose growth and progress depend upon the
development and conservation of its water resources. It is
firmly established by the statutes of this state and judicial
decision that the facilities for the control and distribution
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of the waters of Utah Lake and Jordan River are devoted
to a public use. Section 73-1-6, Utah Code Annotated
1953. Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371, 198 U. S. 361.
Injunctive relief has been consistently denied owners of
property claiming that their property has been taken or
damaged for public use without compensation, when such
owners have been guilty of laches in asserting their claims.
Conaway v. Yolo Water & Power Co., 204 Cal. 125, 266
P. 944, 58 A. L. R. 674. That the defendants are estopped
from any relief sought on account of the construction and
maintenance of the diversion and distribution works at the
Jordan Narrows apparently is conceded. Defendants state
that they "are not complaining so much about the structure at Jordan Narrows as the way it has been handled and
operated, particularly during 1952," and that they "primarily are seeking in the counterclaim to recover damages
for 1952 and to prevent the recurrence of damages by the
unlawful flowage of (their) lands in future years." It
requires no citation of authorities for the proposition that
plaintiffs cannot be held liable for the alleged wrongful
manner of operating and handling diversion and distribution facilities which have been, and will continue to be,
under the exclusive control of the state engineer as shown
by the record in this case. This point is fully covered at
the outset of our argument.
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POINT NO.3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
FROM PLAINTIFFS' REPLIES THE FIFTH
DEFENSE CONTAINED THEREIN.
Said defense reads as follows:
"Fifth Defense

"Ever since 1885 to the present time, plaintiffs
have openly, notoriously, continuously, adversely
and under a claim of right against all the world,
impounded the waters of Utah Lake and flowed the
lands bordering said lake at such times and under
such conditions as specified and set forth under
Compromise Agreement" ( R. 175, 185) .
r

Defendants have alleged under their answers and
counterclaims that the issues in this case may affect or
involve persons or their successors in interest owning lands
adjacent to Utah Lake, who were not parties to Compromise
Agreement (R. 91, 92, 96, 117, 121). Plaintiffs' fifth defense is material as to such claim. Said defense pleads, as
to a:riy such parties, that plaintiffs have acquired prescriptive rights to flow their lands coextensive with the rights
existing under Compromise Agreement. Said prescriptive
rights were recognized by the findings of fact made in
the Morse Decree in the year 1901 which state as follows:
"That ever since 1885, to the present time, the
said city and said canal and irrigation companies
have openly, notoriously, continuously and adversely against all the world, maintained and used said
Utah Lake as a reservoir and said dam as an impounding dam, to hold back and store the waters
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in the lake, when necessary to do so, in order to
supply their needs during seasons of scarcity of
water, and the said city and canal and irrigation
companies have each contributed an equal share of
all costs and expenses of all matters growing out of
such joint enterprises."

POINT NO.4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
FROM PLAINTIFFS' REPLIES THE TENTH
DEFENSE TO THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE
DEFENDANT, PROVO CITY, AND THE ELEVENTH DEFENSE TO THE COUNTERCLAIM
OF DEFENDANTS, UTAH LAKE FARMERS
ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
Said tenth and eleventh defenses are as follows:
"The claims asserted by said defendant (defendants) in said counterclaim and the issues made
by said counterclaim are such as are not subject to
determination and adjudication in this action" (R.
176, 186).
This defense raises two questions: first, are the claims
set forth in said counterclaim justiciable in this action
and, second, is the counterclaim properly pleaded.
It must be borne in mind in considering these questions the basis of the action brought by the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have asked no relief whatsoever against any of
the defendants. The Compromise Agreement and the Hatch
Decree interpreting said agreement, as defendants contend,
cast upon these plaintiffs the burden of maintaining the
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evidence fixing Compromise Point and thereby making
effective the terms of the Compromise Agreement. It is
immaterial how the monuments fixing Compromise Point
were destroyed. The admitted fact is that they were destroyed and in order to determine the rights and the obligations of the respective parties to the Compromise Agreement, it is necessary that that point be re-established, if
the decree of the court and the contract between the parties are to be made effective. We are not unmindful of
the extent to which the rules as to pleading have been relaxed by the new rules of civil procedure; but we do not
concede that there are no limitations as to the manner by
which a plaintiff makes his claim against a defendant. In
the complaint herein and in the answers filed by the defendants, the following facts are admitted:
1. The location and geography of Utah Lake and
Jordan River.
2. The controversy between the landholders around
Utah Lake and the water users in Salt Lake County prior
to the execution of the Compromise Agreement.
3.

The Compromise Agreement.

4.

The Hatch Decree.

5. The fixing of Compromise Point under the Compromise Agreement and the Hatch Decree.
6. The destruction of the monuments evidencing
Compromise Point.
7.

The necessity that that point be restored.

8. The existence of the Utah Lake Commission and
its functions.
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To the complaint in this case, the defendants interprose
their counterclaims, alleging in said counterclaims that the
plaintiffs have stored water in Utah Lake above Compromise Point and contrary to the rights granted plaintiffs
in the Compromise Agreement. It is obvious that no determination of this question could under any circumstances
be made until the court had established the elevation of
Compromise Point, which point fixed the storage rights of
the plaintiffs herein. The rights of all of the parties to
this agreement are fixed and limited, and dependent upon
and contingent upon the height to which the waters of Utah
Lake can be raised and the extent to which the lands of
the defendants may be flooded.
Without in anyway waiving our contentions heretofore made that for the past fifty years the plaintiffs herein have in no way controlled the impounding of the waters
in Utah Lake and the distribution of the waters from Utah
Lake to the plaintiffs herein, plaintiffs contend that the
counterclaims of the defendants are premature and should
be stricken because of the fact that Compromise Point has
not been fixed and determined by the court.
In the case of Bach v. Quigan, 5 F. R. D. 34, an action
was brought under authority of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 for an alleged violation of subdivision (a) ( 4)
of that section. The Securities and Exchange Act provides
that if a dealer or broker offering for sale or purchase any
security shall make any false or misleading statement with
respect to any material facts, it shall be actionable. Plaintiffs sought to recover from defendant Quigan losses
sustained through the purchase of certain stocks as a re-
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suit of false statements made by Quigan. The statements
were made by Quigan to one Traubner, a customer's man,
and repeated by Traubner to plaintiff. Traubner is brought
into the action by Quigan as a third party defendant.
Quigan counterclaimed against Traubner. The second counterclaim alleges a conspiracy between plaintiff and Traubner to mulct Quigan. Quigan maintains that both of his
counterclaims "sound in consiparcy and malicious abuse
of process."
\

In this case Judge Moscowitz used the following
language:
"This Court is in complete accord with the statement of defendant that the new Rules of Civil Procedure have displaced any archaic, obsolete and confusing rules which may previously have governed
federal procedure and that they are designed for
the swift and just disposition of legal disputes.
However, it was never contemplated that any set
of facts which might eventually constitute a 'claim
upon which relief can be granted' should be interposed as a counterclaim to an action and it would
not be an aid to the swift and just disposition of the
matter to permit the issues to be confused by an
uncertain claim, the substance of whi~h is contingent upon the outcome of the principal action.
,.'Plaintiffs move to strike· out the first and
second counterclaims from defendants' answer on
the ground that they 'fail to ~tate a cause of action'
against plaintiffs. As to the second counterclaim,
plaintiffs seek the alternative relief of an order
requiring that it be made more definite and certain.
"The counterclaim must be examined to determine if there are set forth therein facts which
constitute a claim even under this liberal interpretation of pleading."
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The counterclaim was stricken as premature. The
above case is cited with approval in Volume 1, Barron &
Holtzoff, Section 356, Page 643.
Barron & Holtzoff, Volume 1, Section 255, holds that a
counterclaim must be so stated that, upon default, judgment might be entered in favor of the counterclaimants.
Under this obviously applicable rule, it is interesting to
examine the counterclaims of the defendants herein. The
counterclaims allege that the defendants, or some of the
defendants and other parties similarly situated own undescribed lands along the shores of Utah Lake, and that
at sometime in the past the plaintiffs have stored water in
Utah Lake contrary to the provisions of Compromise
Agreement and have thereby flooded lands of the several
defendants and damaged them in mass to the extent of
$750,000. Under established law, defendants are not entitled to sue under a class suit and under such holding it
would be utterly impossible to determine how much of the
claim of defendants is in behalf of people who cannot sue
or who cannot be represented in a class suit and the defendants who are entitled to individually complain. Because of the insufficiency of the allegations of the counterclaim and the uncertainty of the claim which is asserted
and because any claim of the defendants is contingent upon
fixing of Compromise Point, said counterclaim is premature and should be dismissed.
(

Heretofore in this brief, it has been asserted, and we
believe cannot be disputed, that at all times within the
period complained of by the defendants the waters of Utah
Lake and Jordan River have been administered either by
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a duly appointed court commissioner or by the state engineer of the State of Utah and that said administration has
further been subject to the direction of the Utah Lake and
Jordan River Commission, the joint agent of the parties
hereto. If the defendants herein have suffered any wrong
or their rights have been in any degree invaded, that invasion has been due entirely to the conduct of those who
distributed the waters and to their agent, the Utah Lake
and Jordan River Commission.
In the case of Fort Chartres and Ivy Landing Drainage and Levee Dist. No. 5 of Monroe and Randolph County, State of Illinois, v. Thompson, et al., 4 Federal Rules
Decisions 369, the court held as is reflected in the first
syllabus in said action:
"So-called counterclaims for interpleader which
were neither counterclaims against plaintiff nor
cross-claims against a codefendant, but were directed solely against persons who were not parties to
the action, should be dismissed as not warranted by
the Federal Rules. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
rules 13 (h), 14, 28 U. S. C. A. following section
723c."
Since neither the state engineer, nor the Utah Lake
Commission is made a party to defendants' counterclaims,
said counterclaims should be dismissed.
In Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Coffelt,
11 Federal Rules Decisions 443, the court held that the
counterclaim should be dismissed as premature since the
relief sought was wholly dependent upon plaintiff's failure
to prevail in the principal action.
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In Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 264 P. (2d) 279 (Utah),
Justice Henroid, speaking for the court says:
"It is true that our new rules should be 'liberally construed' to secure a 'just * * * determination of every action,' but they do not represent a one-way street down which but one litigant
may travel. The rules allow locomotion in both directions by all interested travelers. They allow plaintiffs considerable latitude in pl~ading and proof,
to the point where some people have expressed the
opinion that careless legal craftsmanship has been
invited rather than discouraged. Be that as it may,
a ·defendant must be extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and to meet an adversary's claims. Also he must be protected against
surprise and be assured equal opportunity and facility to present and prove counter contentions,-else
unilateral justice and injustice would result suf..
ficient to raise serious doubts as to constitutional
due process guarantees."
It does not satisfy the situation to say that plaintiffs
should move for a more specific statement. The pleadings
and admissions of defendants and the record before this
court show conclusively that defendants cannot so amend
their so-called counterclaims as to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
POINT NO.5
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
FROM PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT, UTAH
LAKE FARMERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
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THE TWELFTH
THEREIN.

DEFENSE

CONTAINED

Said defense reads:
/"Twelfth Defense

"Said defendants, who purport to sue under
said counterclaim on behalf of themselves and as
members of a class, are endeavoring to bring numerous causes of action as representatives of a class
against plaintiffs, and such causes of action are not
authorized nor maintainable by defendants as members of a class under the Utah Rules of Ci vi.l Procedure and the character of the alleged rights sought
to be enforced by said defendants are not such as
can be enforced and adjudicated in a class action"
(R. 176).
The counterclaim of Utah Lake Farmers Association,
et al., purports to be brought by said unincorporated association and the individual counterclaimants named therein, on
· behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, to recover
damages, which, however, are not specified, and it is
prayed: "that the court, after determining and declaring
the respective rights of the parties and the question of
liability of the plaintiffs, reserve jurisdiction for the purpose of entertaining, and that it entertain and receive, the
claims of all persons owning land abutting, or in the vicinity of, Utah Lake, for damages for flooding, inundating
or saturation for which plaintiffs may be determined liable
and after consideration through a master or directly, enter
judgment against the plaintiffs for damages therefor;"
(R. 106-107).
Said· twelfth defense, which was stricken by the trial
court, is based on the holding of this court that numerous
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individual claims for damages, which are several, cannot
be determined and adjudicated on the basis of class representation alone. Nunnelly, et al. v. First Federal Building
& Loan Association of Ogden, et a.l., 107 Utah 347, 154 P.
(2d) 620, 107 Utah 379, 159 P. (2d) 141. Defendants have
argued that said case is not controlling because it was decided prior to the effective date of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. We submit, however, that there is nothing contained in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which has
extended the class action device so as to overrule the holding
in the Nunnelly case. Representative suits have been long
recognized by courts of equity even without the existence
of express statutes or rules authorizing class" actions. The
principal purpose of the Utah rule (Rule 23) , which was
taken from the federal rule, was to permit representative
suits in actions at law as well as in equity proceedings,
provided the character of the right sought to be enforced
otherwise met the prerequisites for bringing a class action.
POINT NO. 6
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
FROM PLAINTIFFS' REPLIES THE ELEVENTH DEFENSE TO THE COUNTERCLAIM
OF THE DEFENDANT, PROVO CITY, AND
THE THIRTEENTH DEFENSE TO THE
COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANTS, UTAH
LAKE FARMERS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
Said defenses read:
"A determination of the issues involved in said
counterclaim and an adjudication of the rights
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sought to be enforced thereby cannot be determined
and adjudicated without the joinder of additional
indispensable parties, including, in additiqn to plaintiffs, all of the numerous persons entitled to use
water from said irrigation system and the State
Engineer of the State of Utah who is charged with
the duty and responsibility of controlling and regulating the waters of said irrigation system under
the laws of the State of Utah, which indispensable
parties to said counterclaim, however, are neither
necessary nor proper parties to the action instituted
by plaintiffs" (R. 176-177, 186-187).
The administration and distribution of the waters of
Utah Lake and Jordan River and the operation of the facilities installed for such purpose have been since the year
1925 and will continue to be, under the exclusive control of
the state engineer through his duly appointed water commissioner. Defendants claim that their lands have been
flowed in excess of the rights granted under Compromise
Agreement because of the manner in which said facilities
have been handled and operated. If there is any substance
to such claim, which we deny, it is obvious that the state
engineer and the water commissioner appointed by him to
distribute the waters of said lake and river, are indispensable parties to any proceedings instituted to redress such
alleged grievances. The storage of water in Utah Lake,
which is provided for through the flowage rights granted
under Compromise Agreement, is an integral part of the
Utah Lake-Jordan River System. The water rights and
priorities determined under the Morse Decree are predicated upon the storage rights created by Compromise Agreement. If proceedings be instituted to obtain relief against
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the state engineer and his water commissioner for alleged
wrongs in the administration of said water system and such
proceedings involve said storage rights in Utah Lake, all
persons having the right to the use of water under said
system would be interested and necessary parties to such
proceedings.
POINT NO. 7
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
FROM P L A I N T I F F S ' REPLIES THE
TWELFTH DEFENSE TO THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT, PROVO CITY,
AND THE FOURTEENTH DEFENSE TO THE
COUNTERCLAIM OF THE DEFENDANTS,
UTAH LAKE FARMERS ASSOCIATION, ET
AL.
Said defenses read as follows :
"Said counterclaim involves the determination
of issues and attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of
this court to adjudicate and enforce rights with respect to the storage, division and distribution of the
waters of Utah Lake and the Jordan River, the
adjudication and enforcement of which rights are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the
case of Salt Lake City, a muncipal corporation, et
al., Plaintiffs, vs. Tamar Anderson, et al., Defendants, Case No. 57298, which is now pending in said
District Court of Salt Lake County and in which
case said court has ordered in accordance with the
decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in such case,
that said case proceed in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 4, Title 100, Utah Code Anno-
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tated 1943, and amendments thereto (now found in
C;hapter 4, Title 73, Utah Code Annotated 1953) ~
and that the state engineer be directed to perform
the duties imposed upon him by the provisions of
said statute and to comply therewith, to the end
that there may be a determination and adjudication
of all the rights to the use of the waters of Utah
Lake in Utah County, Utah, and of the Jordan
River in Utah arid Salt Lake Counties, and its tributaries" (R. 177, 187).
During the pendency of the Tamar Anderson case in
the District Court of Salt Lake County, which involves a
general adjudication of rights to the use of the waters of
Utah Lake, Jordan River and their tributaries, the water
commissioner appointed by the state engineer to administer
said waters is an "arm" of said court charged with the
duty of distributing said waters to the various users entitled thereto in accordance with existing decrees. Should
he refuse or neglect to discharge such duty, any injured
party has recourse to the District Court of Salt Lake
County as pointed out under the opinion rendered by this
court in the Tamar Anderson case. Jurisdiction to restrain
or prohibit alleged wrongs on the part of said water commissioner is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Salt Lake County under whom he serves. In
Caldwell v. Erickson (supra) a commissioner appointed by
the District Court of Sevier County to distribute the waters
of Sevier River and a water commissioner appointed by
the state engineer for the same purpose, each claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the administration of said waters.
This court said: "An inevitable consequence has been an
intolerable condition of affairs rendering it imperatively
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necessary that the rights of the contending parties should
be adjudicated and determined by a competent tribunal."
An equally intolerable situation would exist unless the
District Court of Salt Lake County, before which a general
adjudication is pending, is held to have exclusive jurisdiction over the matters involving the water commissioner's
discharge of his legal duties in the administration and distribution of the waters in question during the pendency of
said action. Suppose the District Court of Utah County
issued an inj ~nction as prayed for by defendants, which
ordered plaintiffs to operate and handle the facilities for
distributing the waters of said lake and river as directed
by said court. Such an order would abrogate the jurisdiction and control over said facilities vested in said water
commissioner under Chapter 5, Title 73, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Suppose, also, that the District Court of Salt
Lake County concurrently entered an order restraining
plaintiffs from interfering with said distribution works
and directing that the water commissioner serving under
said court continue his control and operation of the same in
accordance with the power and authority vested in him by
statute. The judicial chaos which would result from such
conflicting orders is, of course, avoided under the salutary
rule that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires
jurisdiction of the subject matter of a case, it retains such
jurisdiction exclusively, subject only to appellate review,
until a final determination of the matters pending before it.
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POINT NO.8
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING
CERTAIN PORTIONS FROM PLAINTIFFS'
ANSWER TO DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVIT
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
The trial court ordered stricken from said answer a
portion thereof which pleads and sets forth the order of the
District Court of Salt Lake County entered February 13,
1914, directing the construction of the facilities in the
Jordan River at the Jordan Narrows for measuring, diverting and distributing the waters of said river and Utah Lake,
and the orders entered in the Tamar Anderson case decreeing a general adjudication of rights to the use of said waters
and authorizing the appointment of water commissioners to
administer and distribute the same in accordance with
existing decrees pending such general adjudication. The
materiality and relevancy of said orders has been covered
in the points hereinbefore argued, and in order not to be
repetitious, we submit the same in support of this point.
(
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CONCLUSION
Defendants by their counterclaims request the court to
issue an injunction against plaintiffs relating to the operation of the diversion works and measuring devices in the
Jordan River at the Jordan Narrows and to hold plaintiffs
liable for damages claimed to have resulted from the manner in which such facilities have been operated. The indisputable facts in the record and of which this court takes
judicial notice show, however, that: Said facilities were
installed in the year 1914 under an order of the District
Court of Salt Lake County for the purpose of diverting
and distributing the waters of Utah Lake and Jordan River
in accordance with existing court decrees; said facilities were under the control and management of a commissioner appointed by said District Court from the time of
their installation until the year 1925 when he was superseded by a water commissioner appointed by the state
engineer as provided by statute; thereafter the state engineer through his duly appointed water commissioners has
continuously operated and exercised exclusive control over
said facilities; and plaintiffs have never handled, controlled
or operated the same since their construction.
Defendants also assert that the perpetual easement
granted to plaintiffs under Compromise Agreement in the
year 1885 for the flowage of the lands bordering Utah Lake
is limited and restricted to waters draining into said lake
which have the same source as existed at the time of said
agreement. This contention is based solely upon what.D~n:
I&.N() ll N 1:.$
tiUB conceive and allege to have been contemplated by the
parties. Such interpretation of Compromise Agreement is
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contrary to its expressed terms, the construction judicially
placed thereon in the Colladge Case and the practical interpretation adopted by the parties thereto for more than
half a century.
Finally, defendants claim that the channel of the Jordan River has been adopted by plaintiffs as a private channel ·for the transportation of their irrigation water and
that; therefore, plaintiffs were charged with the duty· of
removing certain obstructions in said river resulting from
landslides along the same occurring in the year 1952 when
unprecedented flood conditions existed in Salt Lake and
Utah Counties. The premise upon which defendants would
have the court impose said duty and liability for neglect
thereof is not supported by the facts of which this court
takes judicial notice: The Jordan River is a natural channel, which, subject t,O the control of the state engineer, has
been used for many years by numerous appropriators, other
than plaintiffs, to convey the waters of said lake f<;>r various
beneficial uses in Salt Lake County; and the authority to
remove such alleged obstructions from the channel of said
river is vested by statute in the board of county commissioners o( the county within which said channel is located.
The trial court erred in not dismissing defendants'
counterclaims and in striking certain portions from plaintiffs' replies and plaintiffs' answer to defendants' affidavit
and petition for preliminary injunction. The controlling
facts in this case, concerning which there can be no substantial controversy, establish as a matter of law that defendants are not entitled to any relief against plaintiffs

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49

under said counterclaims. The rule providing for an intermediate appeal is especially designed to afford the relief
which we request, thereby preventing protracted, expensive
and unnecessary litigation.

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM W. RAY,
C. E. HENDERSON,
of
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES,
& HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
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